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## SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *Phil. Stud.* = *Philosophische Studien*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *R. I. d. Fil.* = *Rivista Italiana di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*; *Phil. Jahr.* = *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*.—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

### LOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL.

*La théorie biochimique de l'hérédité.* FELIX LE DANTEC. *Rev. Ph.*, XXIV, 5, pp. 457-494.

The aim of this paper is to show of what extreme precision the biochemical explanation of heredity is susceptible, and how coherent is the whole body of scientific truth to which its methodical study leads. The author objects to the 'vitalistic' and 'representative particle' theories as being false and anti-scientific. Chemical reaction has been looked upon as destruction, hence assimilation or construction, the characteristic of all living bodies, and of these only, has been placed outside the domain of chemistry, or has been called a new chemistry. In the realm of inorganic chemistry, chemical determinism is rigorous, and it would therefore be illogical to admit that properties called 'vital' escape this determinism. Even though the molecular structure is unknown, the properties by which a certain body is characterized may be considered chemical. True, living bodies are constantly changing, but there comes a time, of greater or less duration, in which this state is defined. Living beings have quantitative variation due to assimilation, and may vary in size by mere growth or by reproduction. This reproduction, caused by assimilation, transmits not only morphological characters but also individual properties which give birth to common characters. Considered at any moment of its existence, the individual is the product of its inheritance and its education. At no moment, therefore, is it independent of heredity. The question of divergence then arises. This divergence is due to a preponderance of one or another of the chemical properties of the parental 'plastides' and to the inheritance of acquired characteristics.

F. M. WINGER.

*The Psychological Evidence for Theism.* G. M. STRATTON. *The New World*, June, 1899, pp. 326-343.

This article is a criticism of James's argument in his essay on "Reflex Action and Theism." James contends that theism is the only

theory of the world which really offers an adequate object for my volitional activities, hence it is the most satisfactory view, since perception and intellect exist only for the sake of conduct. The subordination of intellect to conduct is established by the fact that all our actions are essentially of the reflex type, since the sensory and cerebral activities exist only for the sake of the muscular contractions they produce. Against this, Stratton maintains that reflex action cannot prove that intellect exists for conduct. Reflex action, so far as it proves anything, would lead us to believe that, not my intellect only, but mind in general is an unaccountable superfluity. Theism cannot be established in this way. The critic, however, finds that James has really another argument in view, namely, that as muscular conduct is the end and perfection of all nervous processes, so perception and intellect exist for the sake of 'mental' conduct. Physical conduct has significance only in so far as it is the outward symbol of the spiritual activity of will and feeling which is the real activity and conduct. On this view, intellect is incomplete if it does not lead to full activity of the will, and theism is the only theory of the world which allows full play to volition. But even in this form the argument is still in need of amendment. The contrast between theism and other views is not that the one furnishes an object which calls forth all our powers while the others do not. It can be shown that theism is stern and repressive in many directions. The preëminence of theism above all other forms of thought is that it calls forth and justifies the one power—that of conscience—which we feel is worth all the others together. All non-theistic views of the world do violence in some way to this feeling of duty. It is clear that if we are to argue for a theistic view of the universe from the fact of our activities and the need of giving them scope, we must arrange our activities in some scale of worth. It is impossible to satisfy them all; we can only hope, therefore, to obtain some view which will satisfy the highest.

DAVID IRONS.

*Die Prinzipien der Mechanik von Hertz und das Kausalgesetz.* JAKOB HACKS. Ar. f. sys. Ph., V, 2, pp. 202–214.

To formulate the law of causality both correctly and precisely is a very difficult matter. The illustrations usually cited are too complex, and therefore unsatisfactory. A simple example is that of a body moving in a straight line at a uniform velocity, without being affected by any outside influence. The movement of this body, at any given moment, is the result of the movement of the preceding moment. In this case the law of causation coincides with the law of inertia. The latter might be termed the simplest form of the law of causation, of which it is, indeed, a particular case. The fundamental law of causation is thus formulated by Hertz: "Every free system remains in its state of rest or of uniform movement in the straightest possible course." Hertz thinks it possible, though not probable, that this formula holds good in animate as well as

in inanimate nature. This, however, is not the case. Hertz himself states, as a necessary inference, that, if the velocity of a system could be reversed, the system would pass through the situations of its former movement in inverse order. This inference becomes absurd when applied to the conscious life. Materialism, therefore, is untenable. Lange's refutation of materialism proceeds along different lines. He simply assumes that the law of the conservation of energy holds good in the brain, and from this he concludes that conscious processes must be regarded as superfluous. This assumption has not yet been proven. But, even if it is made, the influence of mind upon physical events is not rendered impossible. The energy of a system contains only the absolute values of the velocities of its individual particles, but not their directions. The law of the conservation of energy may be valid for the entire universe, animate and inanimate, while the fundamental law, nevertheless, has no application to living beings. The law of the conservation of energy is, indeed, an inference from the fundamental law, but not *vice versa*. Lange has refuted only that form of materialism which denies all influence of conscious processes upon physical events. There is, however, another form of materialism which he has not refuted. This materialism assumes originally space, time, matter, the relations of matter, and the fundamental law. Living beings are produced under unknown conditions, through *generatio æquivoca*. The conscious processes thus originated exert upon physical movements an influence which is assumed to be compatible with the law of the conservation of energy. The fundamental law, however, suffers an exception in that systems containing animated beings are not forced to continue their movements in the straightest possible course. The only difficulty in this position is in reference to the *generatio æquivoca*. It is not easy to see how a law of nature can produce exceptions to itself, and thus partly destroy itself. We must conclude, therefore, that it is not possible, upon a materialistic basis, to construct a self-consistent *Weltanschauung*. The contradiction, however, does not arise because mental activity exerts no influence upon physical events, and hence Lange's conclusion that existence cannot be ascribed to matter in itself has been drawn from incorrect premises.

BOYD BODE.

*Fonction et finalité.* EDMOND GOBLAT. Rev. Ph., XXIV, 5, pp. 495-505; 6, pp. 632-645.

The real purpose of physiology is the demonstration of finality. Finality is necessity, the universal principle of determinism. The function of a living tissue is the accomplishment of the end and aim of its organization; and a complex fitness between an organ and its function gives an impression of finality. Reflex acts are final processes, and voluntary activity is a final activity. The author supports his theory by numerous examples of the universal adaptation of function to end, using the higher to explain

the lower, and the psychological to explain the physiological, and *vice versa*.

F. M. WINGER.

*Fragen der Geschichtswissenschaft. I. Darstellende und begriffliche Geschichte.* PAUL BARTH. V. f. w. Ph., XXIII, 3, pp. 323-359.

In this series of articles the author intends to take up the problem and methods of the science of history as they have been developed in the discussion which was aroused by the appearance of K. Lamprecht's *Deutsche Geschichte*. In the present article he criticises the position of von Below, Lamprecht's opponent, and draws a distinction between *darstellende* and *begriffliche* history. Von Below thinks that an historian should not look through the spectacles of a natural scientist; and hence is not obliged to seek for a purely regular evolution, for this is not compatible with devotion to a social ideal, or to any ideal whatever. In the second place, the historian does well to keep his method entirely distinct from that of the empirical psychologist. He is not concerned with the validity of the law of causality as applied to human affairs. For him, personality is in fact a riddle. His attitude is that of an artist toward a work of art, or, in the words of Schopenhauer, he regards "things apart from the principle of sufficient reason." This was the view of history until the time of the Renaissance. The distinction between science and art is that with the latter the concrete may be only an *ideal*, while with the former it is a *fact* that has existed or exists now. In art, the universal must be closely associated with the particular. Science does not regard personality as a riddle, but as the product of causes concealed by imperfect knowledge. Science recognizes only unexplained, not unexplainable, knowledge. The historian may ignore the law of causality, but may not deny its existence. Von Below quotes Stammler who says the law of causality has no application to human affairs. Stammler thinks his dualism is the same as that of Kant, but it is not, for it is too sweeping, and would destroy all science of mind, while Kant excluded only moral acts from the universal rule of law. Of course, there is no equality of cause and effect in the inner as there is in the outer world, but this does not prove that there is no causality there. History, as it is treated by von Below and the majority of historians, might better be called *darstellende* history. But the thinker who sees the constant in the changing, the universal in the particular, demands something more. As long as von Below confined himself to the former he could ignore law; but he cites two universal truths, thus admitting both law and causality. Uniformities exist in history, and it is the place of the historian to seek the causes for them; and here psychology must come to his aid. Some, Dilthey among them, have urged the necessity of a special psychology of history. Such psychology, however, would be but a treatment of the general science of history, and hardly demands a separate treatment. In the future the historian will study psychology. The psychology of groups

of men is not of a different character from that of individuals, E. de Roberty to the contrary notwithstanding. Only ideas which find universal recognition are historical, but this is not sufficient to found a separate psychology of history. As examples of psychological laws which are of historical value, the writer mentions and illustrates the law or principle of the re-inforcement of contrast, of creative synthesis, and of the growth of psychical energy. After discussing the fitness of several terms to describe this kind of history; such as *sociologische*, *wissenschaftliche*, and the like, he fixes upon the term *begriffliche*; for this term refers to universals and not to individuals and implies a system or connection between concepts. Lamprecht, in his history, attempts to carry out this method. His fault is that he does not distinguish sufficiently between empirical and causal laws. Both sorts of history are alike necessary to every investigator. *Begriffliche* history has found a place in almost all historical writers. It is the desire of the writer that what has happened unconsciously in the past shall in the future happen with more consciousness, more philosophical thought; and as the once despised philosophy has, since Helmholtz, done much for German science, so there need be no fear that harm will be wrought by it to German historical investigation and writing.

HARRY L. TAYLOR.

#### PSYCHOLOGICAL.

*Zur Psychologie der Urteile.* J. v. KRIES. V. f. w. Ph., XXIII, 1, pp. 1-48.

This article discusses, from the side of psychology, a distinction made by the writer in a previous article between judgments of fact and judgments of relation. The corresponding difference in the consciousness of validity, and the forms which this consciousness assumes in the totality of real thought processes are indicated, and the chief logical types distinguished. In judgments of relation, the validity is immediately evident; in judgments of fact, a foreign element enters in. In judgments of fact, uncertainty is always due to our ignorance of the real facts; in judgments of relation, the uncertainty, if present, may be due to the nature of the case and therefore admit of no discussion; *e. g.*, whether a given color, as it appears to the subject, ought to be classed as red. Judgments of relation which subsume a given case under a general concept may be called typical, if doubt is impossible, atypical, if room is left for doubt. To the latter class belong all judgments relating to psychological comparison, for these judgments are fundamentally different from judgments of mathematical equality. Judgments of likeness assert chiefly that there is not sufficient reason to assert a difference. These various types of judgment are very schematic, and we often diverge widely from them in our actual judgments. Thus judgments, the validity of which is self-evident, shade off by imperceptible degrees into judgments which, while having an *operative* signifi-

cance, are yet obscure in content. Neither in practical life nor for scientific purposes is it always necessary to determine to which type of validity our concepts belong. The gradual psychological transition from the analytic to the synthetic judgment is within certain limits of no serious practical consequence. The insight which the psychological analysis of the consciousness of validity affords, however, suggests the numerous possibilities of error in thinking. It is hardly possible to state the psychological nature of judgment in general, because judgment includes many variable and psychologically different elements. In every kind of judgment, not only the feeling of validity, but also the nature and the interrelations of the representations which are joined together in the judgment, have a certain unanalyzable distinctiveness.

BOYD BODE.

*Entgegnung auf H. Schwarz's Kritik der empiristischen Willenspsychologie und des Gesetzes der relativen Glücksförderung.* CHRISTIAN V. EHRENFELS. V. f. w. Ph., XXIII, 3, pp. 261-284.

In this article, the writer takes up and answers one by one the objections made by H. Schwarz to his Theory of the Will, and also explains more carefully the parts most likely to be misunderstood. While he has sought to explain the coincidence of the relative *Glücksförderung*—the difference between an actual state of feeling and one that is only possible—with the greater tendency of ideas to persist, from a purely physiological standpoint, he does not regard this as the only explanation, and insists that the law of relative *Glücksförderung* does not in any way depend on the physiological hypothesis. The law requires only a functional relation between the ease of the disposition of ideas to actualize themselves, and the agreeableness of the actualized ideas—a functional relation of the simplest sort, the growth of one corresponding to that of the other. However, none of Schwarz's objections excludes the physiological explanation. The greatest pleasure at the beginning and not throughout the whole action is the element which determines the will. Volition is not always accompanied by actual pleasure, but sometimes even by pain, the diminution of already existing pain or of unpleasant ideas. Several desires can exist simultaneously in the mind, sometimes even after one has become the object of choice. Strength of will is a dispositional or potential, but not a psychologically actual concept. Schwarz's law of motivation tends to exclude a fundamental element of desire, having struck it out of the series of psychical forces, just as the pure mechanical conception of psycho-physical processes disputes the existence of psychical phenomena. For instance, *Widerstreben* is regarded by him as identical with a striving toward non-existence, and such a striving presupposes the idea of non-existence which has already been obtained by thought or judgment. No desire or volition can be directed upon a means without at the same time being directed upon the end also. A psychically actual volition without a represented end is as much a fiction as a representation without an object.

HARRY L. TAYLOR.

*L'équilibre esthétique.* DR. LÉON WINIARSKI. Rev. Ph. 6, XXIV, pp. 569-605.

Æsthetics may be postulated of individuals or of races, and the aim of æsthetics is attraction. In both ancient and modern times, figure and dress were made as beautiful as possible for purposes of attraction. This is referred to a process of movement; nervous movement on the part of those who feel the effects of the beautiful object, nervous and muscular movement on the part of those who act either in order to produce beauty or from its effects. Æsthetic energy is dependent upon biological energies, and changes as they change. It expresses itself in movement in the making of arms, dwellings, ornaments, and, in more modern times, in sculpture, painting, music, and architecture the types varying according to the race. In the days of chivalry, strength attracted, now skill in arts or sciences does so. Social influence depends upon these acquirements, and the class which has acquired most will rule, although often a mediocre class in other respects. It is all utilitarian, the individual or the race desiring to attain a high position and attaining it according as intensity or duration of pleasure is given. These periods of maximum pleasure are followed and preceded by a period of equilibrium, and just so much pleasure results as there has been energy expended.

F. M. WINGER.

*Le rôle social de la puberté.* ANTOINE MARRO. Rev. Ph. 6, XXIV, pp. 606-631.

The author discusses, (1) the change in the height of the boy or the girl, and in the size of the different parts of the body; (2) the customs of many tribes relative to the ways of manifesting affection, to the development of strength and beauty, to the growth of modesty, and to the types of marriage ceremony. The happiest conditions, he says, are found in the United States where the education of women is given serious attention, and where more constant contact with men gives them better ideas of what a manly man should be. The paper is accompanied with numerous references to other works upon the same and allied subjects.

F. M. WINGER.

*The Development of Voluntary Movement.* E. A. KIRKPATRICK. Psych. Rev., VI, 3, pp. 276-281.

The human infant, unlike most of the lower animals, does not possess the power of motor control at birth, but acquires it only after several months of extra-uterine life. Regarding the manner in which muscular coördination is developed, three hypotheses are possible: (a) the child may consciously *learn* to make the movements; (b) the ability may be inherited; (c) the movements may be partly provided for by the hereditary mechanism, and partly acquired or learned. Professor Kirkpatrick holds

that the first and second hypotheses are quite untenable, and that the third, if it is to explain the facts adequately, must be modified and made more definite. It cannot be a matter of chance that a child repeats, after a few trials, a sound that he has heard; it must depend upon a fundamental physiological connection between the cortical centers involved. Similarly there must be an inherited physiological connection between the visual centers, stimulated into activity by the sight of an object, and the muscles involved in moving toward that object. This physiological space relation of certain motor reactions to certain sensory stimuli is, in Professor Kirkpatrick's judgment, of an importance hitherto unappreciated both in explaining voluntary movement and in explaining the perception of space.

WM. CHANDLER BAGLEY.

*The Nature of Animal Intelligence and the Methods of Investigating It.*

WESLEY MILLS. Psych. Rev., VI, 3, pp. 262-275.

This article is chiefly a criticism of Professor Thorndike's recent monograph *Animal Intelligence* from the standpoint of the comparative psychologist. The creed of Dr. Thorndike in brief is this: Animals neither imitate, feel sympathetically, reason, nor (probably) remember. Dr. Thorndike's conclusions are attacked by Dr. Mills upon the grounds: (1) that his observations were made under abnormal conditions; (2) that he has omitted details and eliminated individual differences from his records, confining himself almost entirely to generalizations of the broadest character; (3) that he has taken no account of non-experimental observation, but has limited himself to reactions which could be quantitatively estimated; (4) that in his experiments he has overlooked the many possible and actual inhibitions which may and do prevent response to a given stimulus. Besides enumerating these sources of possible error, Dr. Mills brings forth considerable evidence of a positive character which is not at all in harmony with Dr. Thorndike's conclusions. In general, he holds that comparative psychology is advanced rather by systematic observation and experiment than by anecdotes, although the latter are not entirely valueless as Dr. Thorndike would have us believe.

WM. CHANDLER BAGLEY.

*A Study of Geometrical Illusions.* CHARLES H. JUDD. Psych. Rev., VI, 3, pp. 241-261.

It is the aim of this paper to present certain facts which seem to show that the false estimation of angles in the Poggendorf figure is only a secondary effect, not always present, and in no case the source of the illusion. The illusion is rather due to the wrong estimation of certain linear distances, and may be reduced in the last analysis to the type of illusion found in the Mueller-Lyer figure. Professor Judd first points out that the illusion in the Poggendorf figure disappears when the intercepted line is horizontal or vertical; yet if the intercepting parallels, instead of the intercepting line,

be brought into the vertical or horizontal position, the illusion appears in its full intensity. Here we have negative evidence that the false estimation of angles cannot be the basis of the illusion. After enumerating several similar negative evidences, the author turns for a positive solution to the first position of the figure in which the illusion disappears—the position in which the intercepted line is horizontal. If, in this position of the figure, the apparent length of the interval between the points of interception is compared with an equal interval marked off by intercepting parallels which are perpendicular to the given line, the interval in the Poggendorf figure is underestimated. This underestimation was subjected to a quantitative determination by the method employed by Heymans. The figure was then broken up into its elements, in order that the importance of the parts which the different segments of the oblique parallels played in the total illusion might be determined. Certain lines were found which favored the illusion, while certain other lines were found which did not favor it. When the favorable elements are combined, a figure is formed which is identical with the Mueller-Lyer figure for underestimation, while a combination of the unfavorable elements gives a figure identical with the Mueller-Lyer figure for overestimation.

WM. CHANDLER BAGLEY.

*La conscience dans l'anesthésie chirurgicale.* JEAN PHILIPPE. Rev. Ph., XXIV, 5, pp. 506–527.

Surgical anæsthesia offers many sources of information for psychology over and above sleep or hypnotism, because it affords successive gradations from full consciousness to intellectual death, and acts differently at different moments and with different individuals. With man there are two kinds of effects from anæsthesia, (1) upon respiration and circulation, and (2) upon sensibility and motility. Respiration is attacked first, and becomes irregular as the intellectual faculties are impaired. Circulation becomes feeble. Temperature lowers, hence sensibility changes. The number of red corpuscles decreases. The hands and arms, and almost simultaneously the feet and limbs become numb; then chest, abdomen, neck, fore-head, left temple, right temple. Then muscles and organs are attacked. The coördination of muscles learned by education is lost first. Numbness, sensory anæsthesia, and muscular relaxation follow. Anæsthesia advances from periphery to center. But is loss of consciousness complete? The strongest argument for this is that there is no memory of the period; but those who hold that theory wrongly identify memory and consciousness. There may be different degrees of loss of memory. Manifestation of consciousness during anæsthesia is often forgotten afterward, or what was remembered for a time will, if a weak state intervenes, be subsequently forgotten. The memory cannot be relied upon to report accurately that which passes within the mind.

F. M. WINGER.

## ETHICAL.

*Zur Theorie des Gewissens.* MAX WENTSCHER. *Ar. f. sys. Ph.*, V, 2, pp. 215-246.

Very different phenomena are included under the term 'conscience.' Most commonly it means certain determinate processes in the private life of the individual which as 'good' or 'bad' conscience unite themselves to his particular acts as feelings of inner peace or self-condemnation. Further, the concepts of right and wrong dominant in a community are also designated as the manifestations of a conscience. Finally, we mean by the term the universal capacity for intellectual reflection upon right and wrong. This last is essentially the same as Kant's practical reason. The feelings involved in the first meaning of the term arise from a comparison of our act or relation with a representation of duty. This comparison is not made from choice, but is forced upon us. In the 'conscience' of a community we must recognize other elements besides those produced by the needs of the times, for otherwise we are unable to adequately explain our feeling of reverence for its dictates, or the fact that moral philosophy exists and that reformers arise. The practical reason attempts, without reference to the historical point of view, to reduce all moral actions to certain general principles. As to the nature of these principles, there is disagreement. Empiricism attributes them to development, and admits only egoistic impulses as original. The derivation, however, of altruism from egoism involves a psychological fallacy. It is impossible to see how the fundamental motive can ultimately be turned against itself. The three forms of conscience are not absolutely distinct. They unite in the concept of duty, which not only demands that our acts shall conform to it, but also includes an obligation to develop our concept. Ethical and religious ideals prove the existence of a productive factor in the concept of duty. The productive factor necessarily awakens a critical factor, the practical reason. If the concept of duty is to have the force of conviction it must spring from our own ethical insight. This insight, however, is not always fully attainable. The public conscience represents, in purest form, the highest ethical insight to which the combined labor of humanity has been able to attain. It forms the solid basis from which private reflection proceeds, and also an authority upon which it can fall back.

BOYD BODE.

*Can There Be a Sum of Pleasures?* REV. HASTINGS RASHDALL. *Mind*, No. 31, pp. 357-382.

This article is a criticism of a position, held by Green, Bradley, Mackenzie, Caird, and others, that there is no meaning in a sum of pleasures, and that, consequently, the 'hedonistic calculus' is impossible and unintelligible. The author is not a hedonist. For him 'the greatest *quantum* of pleasure' is by no means the *summum bonum*, but yet he claims

that it is a possible and legitimate object of desire, and, therefore, an important part of the content of the *summum bonum*. That we, at least sometimes, desire pleasure is a patent fact of consciousness. He also claims that pleasure is quantitative, and, therefore, that it can be summed. As quantitative it has two dimensions, intensity and duration, in either of which directions it can be increased or diminished. While pleasure cannot be measured with mathematical accuracy yet it is subject to quantitative comparison, rough and vague no doubt, but yet none the less quantitative. The author establishes these positions by copious references to every-day thought and action.

IRA MACKAY.

### HISTORICAL.

*On the Relation Between the Philosophy of Spinoza and that of Leibnitz.*

ROBERT LATTA. *Mind*, No. 31, pp. 333-356.

This article points out the relation between the philosophies of Spinoza and Leibnitz, so far as that relation is determined by the mathematical thought of their day. Mathematics dominated the thought of the seventeenth century. Leibnitz worked from the point of view of the infinitesimal; indeed, he invented the infinitesimal calculus, hence his monads. Spinoza, on the other hand, was more influenced by the method of geometry, and the infinite unity of the system of space implied in all geometrical reasoning, hence his infinite, continuous, all-comprehensive substance or God. This relation also holds true of the theories of knowledge of these two philosophers. *Opinio* or *imaginatio*, mere perception of finite objects or events, is dismissed by Spinoza as absolute illusion, and for him the only true knowledge is that of infinite *ratio* and *scientia intuitiva*. For Leibnitz, however, all knowledge is made up of infinitesimal *petites perceptions*, an infinite number of which is required to make up one single perception. Spinoza worked from the point of view of the mathematical infinite, Leibnitz from that of the mathematical infinitesimal.

IRA MACKAY.

*Hinduism and Christianity—A Contrast.* JOHN R. JONES. *Bibliotheca Sacra*, LV, pp. 591-628.

To one who, like the author, has spent nearly twenty of the best years of his life in missionary work in India, comparison between Christianity and its great Hindu rival is inevitable. The task is difficult because of the manifold character of Hinduism, which is a congeries of faiths, embracing nearly all kinds of beliefs and unbeliefs, conflicting philosophies, diverse forms of worship and warring sects. Yet a few fundamental beliefs and institutions, which have come down from primitive times, give character to the whole system. The Aryan philosophy is perhaps the profoundest the human mind has conceived, and abounds in the most daring flights or

speculation. The staple of Hindu religious thinking is Vedantism, that subtle form of pantheism which finds its best expression in the Upanishads. Christianity is a revelation from God manward ; Hinduism, the embodiment of man's aspirations toward God. Christianity teaches the personality of God ; Hinduism, the doctrine of the impersonal Brahma, the passionless, immovable, unsearchable, ineffable Being, who, without a second, stands as the source and embodiment of all real being. Brahma is the only existence ; all else is illusion. Hinduism is polytheistic as well as pantheistic, yet there is no contradiction between the two doctrines, but one is the natural complement of the other. Christianity teaches that the universe was created by God ; Hinduism that it is eternal. The former represents man as the son of God ; the latter as an illusion whose being can only be assumed for practical purposes. Man came from God, and goes back to God ; his soul existed from eternity as part of the divine soul, to which it will ultimately return. The Hindu's theosophy protects him from materialism, and his psychology against all attempts to reduce the soul to a mere organ of the body. On the ethical side the advantage is distinctly with Christianity, which takes fallen man and leads him to a new life of holiness ; it is active and progressive, while Hinduism is the most conservative of religions and the foe of all progress. According to the Hindu teachers, sin is an intellectual defect ; and observance of the established customs and ceremonies is more important than active virtue. Hinduism has never seriously tried to regenerate the heart and develop character. The immortality of the soul is one of the cornerstones of Hinduism, but is combined with the doctrine of metempsychosis, which is wrought into the very being of the people. Some persons claim that this doctrine is a deterrent from sin and an incentive to virtue ; but the present state of the Hindu race refutes that. Christianity has an ideal which has had great influence ; its Indian rival has none. The worst element in Hinduism is the system of caste, which robs man of independence and self-respect ; the lower classes are taught that to aspire to a more satisfactory life is a sin of the deepest dye. Hinduism is purely ethnic, with no ambition to reach out of India, while Christianity is a missionary faith. The well-known condition of women in India is one of the best proofs of the inferiority of the Hindu religion. The mission of Hinduism was the preservation of the doctrine of the divine immanence, when the West had given it up ; yet Christianity has the promise of the future, even in India itself.

JAMES B. PETERSON.